This article picks up from the previous (Part 1) documenting how Caesar prepared for the invasion, and the events leading up to and following from the crossing.
In the late summer of 55BC, time was of the essence. After dealing with the eighteen-day ordeal across the Rhine, the proposed expedition to Britannia had been delayed. Rather than postponing the journey across the channel to the following summer, it hints at Caesar’s urgency to undertake this expedition, despite knowing full-well the difficulty of mounting and mobilizing a military campaign during winter.
Riding from Coblenz in the west of the Rhine, Caesar arrived at the coast of Northern Gaul. He summoned Caius Volusenus with a single galley to undertake a reconnaissance mission of the British coast. His mission was to scout a series of suitable landing points and gather any information he could about the inhabitants. After Volusenus set sail, Caesar gathered all available forces in the region- approximately amassing two legions- to gather at Pontis Itus (between Calais and Bulogne), the shortest point of crossing, and ordered a fleet of eighty ships to gather at the port.
Over the channel, news swept throughout many of the southern British chieftains of the eminent Roman invasion. Many of whom sought immediate peace and sent across ambassadors, accompanied with hostages, offering Caesar alliance.
Caesar received the ambassadors in a friendly manner, guarantying resolve and granting generous promises of protection. Accepting their hostages, he sent the ambassadors returning, accompanied by Commius, his recently procured ally, that Caesar himself appointed King of the Atrebates, a Belgic tribe in Artois.
Commius was tasked by Caesar to mediate peace-keeping between the British tribes and deescalate hostilities, prompting Roman alliances and promises of protection. Caesar later wrote of Commius ‘a man whose courage, judgement and loyalty he had high opinion of and who was respected in Britain’[1].
Caesar was taken by surprise when envoys from the Morini arrived with apologies for their previous hostilities. Caesar accounts how they 'plead(ed) they were foreigners & ignorant of Roman ways, (…) promising to obey his commands in future' [2]. This granted Caesar a brief relief from dealing with insurrections in Northern Gaul. In Caesar's own belief 'the expedition to Britain (was) much more important than the conquest of these petty tribes' [3]. Caesar accepted their submission and requested they bring forth a considerably higher amount of hostages.
With a fleet of 80 transports sufficient to carry two legions, amassing around 8,000 men, alongside further ships assigned to the quaestor, commanded by generals and officers of the auxiliary: a further eighteen transports were allotted for the cavalry, to sail from a port further south. The remaining army in Gaul was placed under the command of Sabinus & Cotta, with orders to march against the Menapii and those in the Morini who refused send the requested hostages. General Publius Sulpicius Rufus was ordered to guard the Pontis Itus harbour, provided with a considerable force that Caesar deemed 'adequate for the purpose'[4].
The Journey
On the night of the 25th August 55BC, Caesar with his eight thousand legionarii on eighty ships set sail just after midnight. (Albeit delayed by adverse weather conditions). The cavalry transports were instructed to sail ahead, in order to be the first to disembark and instigate the land assault. Through the dark early morning as the ships tossed over the tumultuous sea, the Roman fleet arrived just after dawn. Upon the horizon, Caesar noted the 'montibus angustis' (steep heights) of the unmistakable white cliffs of Dover. This account marks one of the first authoritative primary accounts of British history.
By nine o'clock, the Roman fleet approached further toward the cliffs, greeted by the spectacle of Celts aligning the cliffs-edge. There Caesar noted, '(I) saw the enemy forces, armed, in position on all the hills there. At that point steep cliffs came down close to the sea in such a way that it is possible to hurl weapons from them right down to the shore. It seemed to me that the place was altogether unsuitable for landing.'[5].
Noticing Dover to be a hazarders landing spot, Caesar ordered all ships to sail west, adjacent to the coastline. Around three o'clock, having briefly sailed north-east along the coastline, they anchored between Deal and Warmer. Caesar placed his fleet in sectional commands, pinpointing his zones of landing. Drilling his generals to this high-risk amphibious assault, he required each to move 'rapidly as the situation is constantly changing (and) required the instant execution of every order'. Proceeding roughly seven miles aground, the native Britons closed in from the beach, with cavalry and chariots marching on the shoreline and meeting the Roman ships in the sea, forcing the Romans to disembark in water, restricting their assembled landing.
The Landing
Caesar accounts the trouble he faced upon the embarkation. 'The size of the ships made it impossible to run them aground except in fairly deep water; and soldiers, unfamiliar with the ground, with their hands full and weighted down by the heaven burden of their arms' [6]
Caesar ordered all lighter ships to be 'rowed hard and run ashore' maneuvering against the native’s right-hand flank, hurling a barrage of slingers, archers and artillery fire to drive them back ashore. This would allow the ships to dock closer to the beach. Caesar reports this was 'a highly successful maneuver'[7]. Caesar then ordered all attached vessels (the smaller ships, attached to larger fleets) to be mobilized with troops and taken ashore.
Securing the Beach
Soon enough the native Celts were pushed back from the shoreline and eventually, off the beach, as the coastal insurgency cemented a successful landing. However, without the arrival of his cavalry ships for support- blown off course by heavy coastal winds- Caesar was unable to chase the fleeing natives further in land, who retreated on horseback chariots. Without his cavalry fleet, Caesar was prevented from an immediate advancement and decisive land incision.
After the legions secured the beachfront, many native Celts sent envoys pledging peace, with the standard promise of hostages, and better, the offer to return a captured Roman hostage. Commius, King of the Atrebatian, was arrested and bound by the Celts during his pre-invasion ‘peace-keeping’ mission. After the first day’s assault, Commius was sent back to Caesar attached with an apology, according to Caesar, 'begging to pardon an error due to ignorance'. Caesar pardoned them, accepting their offer of hostages, but demanding furthermore. Over the next four days, chieftains flocked to Caesar's camp, pledging alliance with Rome. Having presumed the success of his landing, Caesar concluded immediate, surrounding hostilities resolved.
The Aftermath
Caesar’s army began to incrementally advance by small incisions west the along south-eastern pocket of Kent. Caesar described this pocket of Kent as ‘hominum est in fita multitudo’: abundant in live-stock, primarily Cattle, with fertile soils for crops and agricultural richness. So much so, his legions were fully-sustained throughout the invasion.
Still waiting for his cavalry transports to arrive, the full-scale advancement was delayed. One night, Caesar noted a full moon that raised the Atlantic tides. That night a violent storm stirred heavy waves to thrash upon the sea, forcing his arriving cavalry fleet, still seeking to join the legions on the beach, to be blown off course, drifting the night at sea amidst the storm. By the morning, unable to advance, the cavalry fleets returned to Gaul.
On that morning back in Britannia, Caesar awoke to find his warships wrecked upon the shore. Thrashed about the waves whilst held at anchor, most ships lane waterlogged and surged to splinters. All ships were destroyed. Caesar and his army fell into great consternation. Having no escape vessels to return across the sea, the considerable risk of encirclement was raised, outnumbered and outflanked by native Celts on a foreign, isolated island. Furthermore, the time, energy and resources required to repair these damaged ships caused major concerns .
Nor had they stored enough provisions of stock or grain to ensure the survival of two legions throughout harsher winters. Simon Schama outlines 'it is doubtful if the number of warships he had commissioned, albeit for a limited operation, would have permitted the carriage of much heavy baggage, or any large numbers of pack animals or quantities of food reserves'[8]. They would have to hunt among the adjacent fields.
To make matters worse, British chieftains, whom had previously sent hostages and pledges of alliance to Rome, heard news of Caesar's consternation and sought to exploit the over-night shift of fortunes. They plotted to disavow their pledges and renew hostilities. Knowing the Roman army would have to hunt for supplies and food, the Celts could attack the foragers with skirmishes, attempting to limit access to grain and corn supplies from nearby fields. These chieftains were intent on prolonging their battle with Caesar into winter. Thereby, they would furtively execute this plan by visiting Caesar with guises of extended pledges and promises of loyalty, subverting Caesar as to raise no suspicions of hostility.
In part 3, I will explore how Caesar dealt with this crisis and how it shaped the course of whis first invasion.
References [1] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, XXI [2] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, XXI
[3] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, XXI
[4] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, XXI
[5] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, XXII
[6] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, XXV
[7] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar
[8] A History of Britain, Simon Schama, p.6
Bibliography
A History of Britain: The Edge of the World 3000 BC-AD 1603, Simon Schama, (The Bodley Head, London, 2009)
The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar (Penguin Classics, London, 1988)
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