In part 2, I outlined the course of events that brought Caesar to Britain in the summer of 55BC. After a night of high and heavy tides, Caesar's fleet of eighty ships lay wrecked on the shore. The local Celtic chieftains sought to play upon Caesar's misfortune, by continuing to pay respects and allegiance to Caesar, but furtively plotting to pick off Roman forages, forcing Caesar and his legions into a long, hard winter of warfare, and ultimately, through a desperate encirclement and starvation, the assured annihilation of the invaders.
After the Shipwreck.
Oblivious to the natives ploy to undermine him, Caesar ordered daily hunts of corn and grain, with collections of timber and bronze to rebuild the damaged ships. Those wrecked beyond repair were dismantled for their parts, to strengthen those lesser damaged. Subsequently twelve ships were rebuilt; according to Caesar, 'rendered tolerably seaworthy'. On one particular occasion, the 7th Legion were sent to gather corn, Caesar noted 'nothing had yet occurred to raise any suspicion of a fresh attack'[1], as the native farmers worked in adjacent fields nearby, and some, as Caesar describes, were actually coming back and forth from the camp.
Suddenly, the guards on the gate noticed a strange and rather large cloud of dust ascending from the direction of the 7th legion. Caesar asserted he had 'guessed the truth-that the natives had hatched a new scheme' [2]. With a swift response, Caesar set out immediately, ordering his cohorts on guard to follow in his direction. Two of these cohorts marched ahead to relieve the 7th. The other cohorts armed up and followed in immediately. It turns out this particular assault was part of a cleverly laid native trap to encircle the Roman foragers.
Much of the corn in the surrounding fields was cut. All except in one place- where the natives sought to entice the Romans toward. Hiding in the woods at night, by the morning, when the Roman forages came to the only field of abundant corn, the natives waited until the Romans had scattered about, with their defenses down, weapons thrown upon the ground, distracted, busy picking crops. The Roman soldiers were caught off-guard, as the natives suddenly leapt out of the woods. The ambush immediately killed many of the 7th, throwing the rest into toil and bewilderment. Preventing the Roman soldiers from rallying in formation, the Celtic chariots and cavalry caused havoc to the 7th legion.
Caesar accounted for this highly effective Celtic battlefield tactic.
Using chariots and cavalry, the Celtic horsemen drove around the field hurling javelins, inspiring terror by their screams, the charging horses and the sound of the wheels, was, as Caesar remarked 'sufficient to thrown their opponents ranks into disorder'[3].
Portrait of the Celtic Chariot
(streoitu rotarum)
Caesar gives a detailed outline of the Celtic counter-attack tactic.
'Then, after making their way between the squadrons of their own cavalry, they jump down from the chariots and engage on foot. In the meantime their charioteers retire a short distance from the battle and place the chariots in such a position that their masters, have an easy means of retreat to their own lines. Thus they combine the mobility of cavalry with the staying power of infantry; and by daily training and practice they attain such proficiency that even on a steep incline they are able to control the horses at full gallop and to check and turn them in a moment. They can run along the chariot pole, stand on the yoke, and get back into the chariot as quick as lightning' [4].
Returning to the Ambush
Caesar and his cohorts marched towards the dust clouds, arriving at the ambush to witness the 7th pinned back and hard pressed by native forces. Despite the pressure, Caesar accounts they were 'holding ground with difficulty, packed closely and pelted with missiles from all direction'[5].
Despite the fierce-bombardment of the Celtic chariots, the 7th withstood the onslaught. Upon arrival of Roman reinforcements, the natives hesitated, allowing the 7th to regain their shape. Caesar admits 'the situation was too hazardous for attacking or engaging in battle', to which he waited and watched from the flanks-until the Celtic chariots and horsemen escaped back into the fields. Having recovered the 7th legion, Caesar and his men returned to camp.
In the following several days a storm of 'continuous bad weather' rained heavy over the area. As a result, it prevented any Roman foraging, or advancements further in land. Conversely, it prevented any native attacks upon the Roman camp.
Meanwhile, the Britons spent this time sending messengers to neighboring tribes, calling for alliances to capitalize upon the weakened state of the Roman army. Even Caesar was fully aware of the perilous position that he and his army found themselves in, pointing out 'what a good opportunity they had of getting booty and liberating themselves for ever, if they could drive the Roman's from their camp' [6].
It was indeed a perilous position, primarily due to the natives tactical ability to swiftly counter-attack and swiftly escape. Even if the legionarii could hold the Celtic attack, without a Roman cavalry support unit of their own, the natives could depart with easy speed. It wasn't long until the neighboring tribes united in a considerable force of infantry and cavalry, marching towards the Roman camp.
Either hearing news of their advancement, or anticipating the inevitability of the assault, saying 'what had happened before would happen again' [7], Caesar prepared the camp for the siege. By a stroke of good fortune, Caesar shrewdly obtained thirty horsemen from Commius, who brought them in across the channel, bolstering Roman troops with a small cavalry support unit. This gave Caesar the advantage and shifted the momentum. Outside the Roman camp, Caesar positioned his legions into battle formation, confronting the approaching natives.
After a brief engagement, the Britons were overwhelmed and began retreating. The newly acquired cavalry unit were ordered by Caesar to push the enemy further inland, pursuing as far as they could; killing the fugitives and setting many surrounding settlements afire. With enough damage inflicted, the Roman cavalry returned with the infantry back to camp.
The Britons had missed their opportunity to deal a direct and decisive blow against Caesar and his stranded army at their weakest point. Never once surrounding nor attacking the fort, instead deciding to deploy hit and run skirmishes on the Roman foragers, with their failed major ambush, it proved ineffective in seriously reducing the number of Roman troops. Caesar had, with thanks to the addition of a borrowed cavalry, turned the tides from a critical defensive position, regaining momentum of attack. As a result, many native chieftains sent envoys to sue for peace; twice as many as before.
A Change of Mind?
Caesar realized the equinox was 'close at hand’, and despite regaining momentum, his legions were still limited in resources, militarily vulnerable by their damaged naval capacity, he began to reconsider the expedition. He reasoned it was ‘better not to expose his damaged ships to the dangers of wintry weather'. Caesar’s halted the advance, ordering his legions to backtrack to the beachfront. Assembling all personnel, Caesar took advantage of a favorable wind and set sail back to Gaul with his two legions shortly after midnight.
Arriving back across the channel, two of his twelve returning transports failed to arrive safely back to port with the rest of the fleet. Heavy tides had carried them further along the coast of Northern Gaul. The two transports landed further astray south in the Morini territory. With three hundred soldiers on board, they disembarked and made their way inland back to the Roman camp. Many tribesman from the Morini began to gather in at first a small force, which after awhile had gathered to approximately six thousand strong.
The three hundred Roman soldiers formed a defensive ring. The Morini, taking advantage of the situation, demanded that the Roman surrender and return their hostages. Little-more is explained about the preliminaries of the battle, but they fought in any case for four hours.
Upon hearing of the missing three-hundred, Caesar sent all available cavalry in the area for support. When the cavalry arrived, they picked off and disrupted the Morini, causing them to flee the battle. Remarkably, at the behest of only a few wounded, none of the three hundred Romans were killed. A defiant show of defensive discipline, which Caesar praised them 'fighting with the utmost bravery' [8]. Roman discipline, tactical strength and skill proved, decisive, once again.
The following day Caesar summoned retaliation. He ordered the returning troops, commanded by Labienus, to hunt down all the Morini hiding in the temporal refuge of the marshes. At this particular time of late summer the marshes were sapped dry, leaving the hiding Morini exposed and prey for battle.
Sabinus and Cotta led a similar assault into the Menapii, but found no natives. Upon returning back to camp, they settled the matter by scorching the earth, destroying crops, slashing corn and burning villages abandoned by the Morini. Labienus and his troops returned to Caesar with a few hostages. Following their return to the Belgic territory, Caesar and his legions began to settle themselves into winter quarters.
Caesar still awaited the promised British hostages to arrive in Northern Gaul. Only two tribes sending so, the rest neglecting their agreements. It suggests the lack of initial serious threat that Caesar’s first invasion had actually posed upon the Britons. Caesar wrote the conclusions of his campaign and sent dispatches to Rome. Receiving news from Caesar, the Senate decreed a public thanksgiving of twenty days.
Lessons learnt?
Overall, Caesar's first campaign in Britain was inglorious and indecisive. He failed to pave a significant land incision, and was unable to secure a stable foothold. As fate would have it, the campaign threw up a series of disasters which limited Caesar's advance, whether it be that he spent almost the entire campaign without a cavalry; or the delays caused from the wreckage of his ships by the storms.
Winston Churchill defended Caesar commenting 'He never even pretended that his expedition had been a success', admitting that the following year Caesar would need to 'supersede the record of it'[9]. In congruence with Churchill, Peter Salway wrote 'we may assume that he announced his intention of returning the following year, since otherwise his demands would have no force' [10].
Early twentieth century historian Bertram C.Windle evaluated the position of Caesar after the first campaign; '(He) returned to Gaul preceded by rumors which made their way to Rome, that he had suffered defeat (...) It was obvious that next year must show a different result' [11]. Despite the declaration from the Senate of a twenty day thanksgiving, they nonetheless would have heard the rumors of a failed invasion. The question remains, was it ever meant to be an invasion; or else, a reconnaissance mission?
It was indeed Caesar's plan to return to Britain the following year. Next time, after learning his lessons of this indecisive first campaign across the channel, he would need a much larger army, blustered by many cavalry units, and a substantial fleet of stronger ships. Undoubtedly, Caesar would have remained concerned as to the fate of the British weather as the subject of his misfortune.
As British history would later prove in the Spanish Armada, the British weather proved an uncanny ally that came to the aid of it's inhabitants from a continental fleet.
References
[1] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, IV,32
[2] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, IV, 32
[3] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, IV, 33
[4] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, IV, 33
[5] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, IV, 33
[6] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, IV, 34.
[7] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, IV,35.
[8] The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar, IV,37
[9] The History of the English Speaking People, Churchill p.3
[10] The Oxford Illustrated of Roman Britain, Peter Salway, p.24
[11] The Roman in Britain, Bertram C.A Windle, p.20
Bibliography
The Roman in Britain, Bertram C.A Windle (Methuen & Co LTD, London, 1923)
An Illustrated History of Roman Britain, Peter Salway (Oxford University Press, London, 2001)
History of the English Speaking People, Winston Churchill (Orion Publishing Group, London, 1999)
The Conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar (Penguin Classics, London, 2001)
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